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Abstract. In recent years, there have been strong interests in the net-
working community in designing new Internet architectures that provide
strong security guarantees. However, none of these proposals back their
security claims by formal analysis. In this paper, we use a reduction-
based approach to prove the route authenticity property in secure rout-
ing protocols. These properties require routes accepted and announced
by honest nodes in the network are not tampered with by the adversary.
We focus on protocols that rely on layered signatures to provide security:
each route announcement is associated with a list of signatures attesting
the authenticity of its subpaths. Our approach combines manual proofs
with automated analysis. We define several reduction steps to reduce
proving route authenticity properties to simple checks that can be auto-
matically done by an automated tool Proverif. We show that our analysis
is correct with respect to the trace semantics of the routing protocols.
1 Introduction
In recent years, there have been strong interests in the networking community
in designing new Internet architectures to address pressing security concerns.
These range from traditional security extensions to Internet routing [15, 20, 21],
to “clean-slate” redesigns [22, 16]. One of the limitations of these proposals is
that these new designs lack formal security proofs – these protocols are evaluated
primarily via experimental evaluations and argued via informal reasoning.
This paper aims to develop techniques for proving security guarantees of the
secure routing protocols. As a step towards eventually analyzing new Internet
architectures, this paper focuses primarily on secure extensions to the current In-
ternet architecture. Briefly, the Internet runs a routing protocol called the Border
Gateway Protocol (BGP), where routers are grouped into various Autonomous
Systems (AS ) administrated by Internet Server Provider (ISP). Individual ASes
exchange route advertisements with neighboring ASes using the path-vector pro-
tocol. Each originating AS first sends a route advertisement (containing a single
AS number) for the destination addresses that it owns. Whenever an AS receives
a route advertisement, it will add itself to the AS path, and then advertise the
best route to its neighbors based on routing policies.
Since these route advertisements are not authenticated, ASes can lie and
advertise non-existent routes, or claim to own destination addresses that they
2do not. These faults may be a consequence of harmless misconfigurations, or
malicious activities, e.g. traffic hijacking or violations of business agreements.
Given these faults may lead to long periods of interruption of the Internet, we
focus on the route authenticity property in Internet routing protocols. Route
authenticity requires that routes accepted and announced by honest ASes in the
network should not be tampered with by the adversary.
There have been a variety of proposed mechanisms [7] that aim to provide
or improve the route authenticity of the Internet routing. For example, Secure
BGP (S-BGP) [15] and pretty secure BGP [20] use cryptographic functions to
sign routing information to prevent malicious routers from altering the routing
information. Many such proposals rely on some form of layered signatures to
provide security: each route announcement is associated with a list of signatures
attesting the authenticity of its subpaths [19, 20, 22, 16]. Intuitively, attackers do
not have the private key of honest nodes, and therefore cannot fake the signatures
that were created by the honest nodes. Consequently, route announcements sent
out by the honest nodes cannot be tampered with by the attacker. We formalize
this intuition and prove route authenticity properties on variants of S-BGP, a
comprehensive routing security solution for BGP that uses layered signatures.
Our framework combines manual proofs with automated analysis, through
the use of novel reduction techniques. Instead of analyzing arbitrary large net-
work instances, we define several reduction steps to reduce the route authenticity
proofs to checks that can either be performed by an automated tool Proverif [6]
or simple enough to be discharged manually. The reduction steps are generic to
the class of routing protocols that we study. We show that our analysis is correct
with respect to the trace semantics of the routing protocols. Our analysis pro-
vides not only a formal proof that a given security property is guaranteed by a
routing protocol, we also provide evidence that the protocol is vulnerable to par-
ticular forms of attacks. This provides a basis for comparing different protocols
based on their security guarantees, costs of deployment and performance.
This paper makes the following contributions:
– We model routing protocols as transition systems, and define trace semantics
for the protocols. We formally define route authenticity properties in a first-
order temporal logic whose semantics is given by the traces (Section 2).
– We define reduction steps that reduce the proof of route authenticity to
conditions that can be either automatically checked or simple enough to
be manually discharged. We have formally proven the correctness of our
reduction steps (Section 3).
– We use Proverif, an automated tool, to check the most complicated condi-
tions, and present case study results (Section 4).
2 Formal Specifications of Secure Variants of BGP
We explore two variants of the S-BGP protocol, each with different security
guarantees. We abstractly model the protocols as transition systems, which en-
code the underlying path-vector protocol used in BGP. We omit the details of
3Malicious Node M ::“ pu, I, Uq Routing state S ::“ H | S,M | S,H
Honest Node H ::“ pu, I,RtTb,Qq Update r ::“ pp, ur, d, Σq
Path p ::“ ru1, ¨ ¨ ¨uns Trace T ::“ S | T αÝÑ S
Signature σ ::“ signppd, pq, skpuqq Action α ::“ sendApu, v, rq
Signatures Σ ::“ rσ1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , σns
Protocol P ::“ pforigpq, fupdpq, fck pq, fapq, δq
Transition Function δ P States ˆ ActionsÑ States
Fig. 1. Constructs for Modeling Routing Protocols
BGP’s import and export policies, since they are not directly relevant to our
security analysis. Instead, we model the policies by a node’s non-deterministic
choice of routes to announce to its neighbors. We formally define route authen-
ticity properties, which will be used as a basis for our security analysis of these
two protocol variants in the next section.
2.1 Formal Model for Secure Routing
Syntax. We use a graph G “ pV,Eq to represent the network topology, where V
is the set of nodes (ASes) and E is the set of links. Gpuq represents the sub-graph
of G that contains all the nodes and links directly connected to u. A node is
either honest, which runs the prescribed routing protocol; or malicious, modelled
using the Dolev-Yao attacker model. We write A to denote the set of malicious
nodes. To simplify our analysis, we assume that the topology (G) and the set of
malicious nodes (A) do not change during the execution of the protocol.
We capture the behavior of routing protocols using a transition system. The
syntactic constructs that we use to formally model the routing protocols are
summarized in Figure 1. M denotes the state of a malicious node, where u is
the unique ID (AS number) for the node, I is its initial knowledge, and U is
the route updates it has learned so far. The initial knowledge I includes the
public and private keys that the attacker knows, and other relevant information
it needs to know to run the routing protocol.
We write H to denote the state of an honest node. In addition to a node
id, and a set of initial knowledge, an honest node uses a routing table RtTb to
store known routes to different destinations, and Q to store the set of update
messages to be processed by the honest node. We write Hpuq (Mpuq) to denote
an honest (a malicious) node of id u. A state in the routing protocol S consists
of all the nodes in the network.
A path p is a list of nodes. We write l1@l2 to denote the concatenation of
two lists l1 and l2. We write σ to denote a digital signature. The signature
of a pair of a path p and a destination prefix d signed by u’s private key is
written signppd, pq, skpuqq. A list of signatures is written Σ. We write r to denote
a route update message, where p is the path, d is the destination, ur is recipient
node of this update, and Σ is a set of signatures associated with this update.
The path-vector protocol and the signature-based authentication mechanism is
parameterized using the following functions:
4– forigpd, us, urq computes a route update for the destination prefix d that
originates at node us.
– fupdpr, us, urq computes a new route update from node us to node ur based
on a route r that us received before.
– fck prq checks the validity of all the signatures in a route update. It returns
true if the route update has the correct format and all the signatures are
valid. We say a route update is valid when fck prq “ true.
– fapGpuq, r, uq is a check on a route update by node u. Note that fap) uses
fck p) as sub-routine. In our case studies, fap) additionally checks that the
route is sent from a direct neighbor. We assume that each node knows its
direct neighbors in the topology Gpuq. This is typically done through a sep-
arate neighbor discovery process which we assume is correct.
The action relevant for our security analysis is the send action sendApu, v, rq,
which denotes node u sends node v a route update r. The transition function δ
maps a pair of a state and an action to another state (δpS, aq “ S1). A trace T
is a sequence of state transitions caused by actions. We write RrpA, G,P, S0qs
to denote the set of traces of executing the protocol P on a topology G given
the set of malicious nodes, and an initial state S0. The behavior of a routing
protocol is captured by the set of traces defined by RrpA, G,P, S0qs.
We write KpMpuqq to denote all the knowledge that a malicious node with
node id u can derive based on the standard Dolev-Yao attacker model. KpMpuqq
is defined by a set of inference rules listed in Figure 7 in Appendix A. Attackers
can deconstruct terms, construct terms from known ones, including generating
signatures using the private keys it knows.
Transition function. The transition function δ for the path-vector protocol is
defined below. For each data structure, we add an apostrophe to represent the
same data structure in the resulting state. For instance, RtTb1puq is the routing
table of node u in the resulting state. We write RtTbrrs to denote the route table
resulted from adding a route update r.
δpS, sendApu, v, rnewqq “ S1
– u is an honest node, rnew “ forigpu, d, vq, uv P E; @w P A, U 1pwq “ Upwq Y
trnewu, and if v R A, Q 1pvq “ Qpvq Y trnewu;
– u is an honest node, Q 1puq “ Qpuqztr1u, fapr1, uq “ true, RtTb1puq “
RtTbrr1s, uv P E, rnew “ fupdpr1, u, vq where r1 P RtTb1puq; @w P A,
U 1pwq “ Upwq Y trnewu, and if v R A, Q 1pvq “ Qpvq Y trnewu;
– u is a malicious node, let rnew “ KpMpuqq, @w P A and w ‰ u, U 1pwq “
Upwq Y trnewu, and if v R A, Q 1pvq “ Qpvq Y trnewu.
There are three possible transitions: (1) an honest node originates a route;
(2) an honest node receives a route and announces an update based on the
received route; and (3) a malicious node sends out an announcement. For each
transition, we allow every malicious node to know the route announcement.
These rules, combined with the definitions of KpMpuqq, capture the adversary’s
capabilities: an attacker can eavesdrop on all route announcements, send out
route announcements to any other node, and decompose and construct messages.
5Predicates P ::“ link pu1, u2q | honest puq | send pu, rq | sendTo pu1, u2, rq
| sent pu, rq | sentTo pu1, u2, rq
Route-dependent Pred PRpr, iq ::“ linkPrev pr, iq | linkNext pr, iq | honestR piq
| sentR pr, iq | sentToR pr, iq
Route-dependent Form FRpr, iq ::“ PR |  FRpr, iq | FRpr, iq ^ FRpr, iq | FRpr, iq _ FRpr, iq
Universal Form F@prq ::“ @i.FRpr, iq
Formula ϕ ::“ P | F@ | ϕ ^ ϕ | ϕ _ ϕ | | ϕ Ą ϕ |  ϕ | @x.ϕ | Dx.ϕ
Fig. 2. Syntax of Formulas
Two S-BGP variants. Both variants of S-BGP associate a route announcement
with a list of signatures: one for each subpath in the route announced. Both
protocols use the same transition systems introduced in the previous section.
The difference is the signature format, and its corresponding fck prq function.
We define the auxiliary functions for each protocol below. We use verifypσ, t, pkpuqq
to represent the signature checking function that returns true if σ “ signpt, skpuqq.
Protocol 1 forigpd, us, urq “ pruss, d, ur, rsignppd, russq, skpusqqsq
fupdppp, d, us, Σq, us, urq “ pp@russ, d, ur, Σ@rsignppd, p@russq, skpusqqsq
fck prus, ur, d, rσsq “ true iff verifypσ, pd, rusq, pkpuqq “ true
fck pp@rus, ur, d,Σ@rσsq “ true
iff fck pp, u, d,Σq “ true and verifypσ, pd, p@rusq, pkpuqq “ true
Protocol 2 forigpd, us, urq “ prus, urs, d, ur, rsignppd, russq, skpusqqsq
fupdppp, d, us, Σq, us, urq “ pp@russ, d, ur, Σ@rsignppd, p@rus, ursq, skpusqqsq
fck prus, ur, d, rσsq “ true iff verifypσ, pd, ru, ursq, pkpuqq “ true
fck pp@rus, ur, d,Σ@σq “ true
iff fck pp, u, d,Σq “ true and verifypσ, pd, p@ru, ursq, pkpuqq “ true
The difference between these two protocols is that the intended receiver is
part of the signature in Protocol 2, while it is not the case in Protocol 1. Both
have the same definition for the fapq function:
fapr, vq “ fck prq and uv P E where r “ pp@rus, d, v,Σq.
2.2 A Logic for Expressing Route Authenticity Properties
We use a first-order logic with one temporal modality to express the route au-
thenticity properties. We explain its syntax and trace semantics.
Syntax. We summarize the syntax of our logical formulas in Figure 2. Predicates
are written P , which includes a predicate representing links in the topology, a
predicate stating whether a node is honest, and predicates on actions on the
traces. We also define a set of route-dependent predicates PRpr, iq that are in-
dexed by a route update and a natural number, which represents a position in
the path in the route update. A node can be uniquely determined by the path
in the route update and the index number. For instance if the route update is
r “ pru1 ¨ ¨ ¨uns, ur, d,Σq, then the ith node of the update r is ui. We define
6A, G, T ( send pu, rq iff u is an honest node implies T “ T 1 sendApu,v,rqÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÑ S
A, G, T ( linkPrev pr, iq iff i “ 1 or pJi´ 1Kr, JiKrq P E
A, G, T ( linkNext pr, iq iff pJiKr, Ji` 1Krq P E
A, G, T ( sentR pr, iq iff u is an honest node implies
r “ pp, ur, d, Σq, and there exists an action sendApu, v, r1q P T
u “ JiKr and r1 “ pp1, u1, d, Σ1q
and p1 is a subpath of p, and |p1| “ i
A, G, T ( sentToR pr, iq iff u is an honest node implies
r “ pp, ur, d, Σq, and there exists an action sendApu, v, r1q P T
u “ JiKr, v “ Ji` 1Kr and r1 “ pp1, v, d,Σ1q
and p1 is a subpath of p, and |p1| “ i
A, G, T ( @i, FRpr, iq iff @i P r1, |p|s,A, G, T ( FRpr, iq, where r “ pp, ur, d, Σq
Fig. 3. Semantics of Formulas
universally quantified route-dependent formula, which is used to define recursive
properties on a path.
Formulas ϕ are the standard first-order logic formulas that make use of the
predicates and route-dependent formulas. To express trace properties, we make
use of one temporal connective a. Formula aϕ means that ϕ is true in every
state on the trace before the current state.
Semantics. We write A, G, T ( ϕ to mean that ϕ holds on the last state of
the trace T , given the topology and the set of malicious nodes. It is inductively
defined over the structure of ϕ. Figure 3 is a summary of the interesting rules.
Predicate send pu, rq is true if the action leading to the current state is node
u sending a route update announcing r. In addition, when i is a malicious node,
send pu, rq is vicariously true, since there is little meaning to assert what a ma-
licious node has sent out.
The rules for route-dependent predicates use JiKr to denote the ith node in
the path of the update r. When n is the length of the route, the n` 1th node is
the recipient node of this update: Jn` 1Kpp,ur,d,Σq “ ur.
Predicate linkPrev pr, iq is true when there is a link between the i´ 1th (the
previous node) and ith node in the path in r. Predicate linkNext pr, iq is true
when there is a link between the ith and i ` 1th node (the next node). The
semantics of sentR and sentToR are similarly defined by using i to index nodes
and subpaths in r. Predicates sentR and sentToR are in effect, past formulas.
A universally quantified route-dependent formula is true if for all the nodes i in
the path of r FRpr, iq is true.
Route authenticity property. We can formally specify the route authen-
ticity properties based on properties on a given route update. For instance,
@i, linkPrev pr, iq ^ linkNext pr, iq requires that all the links in a route update
exist in the network topology.To give another example, @i, sentR pr, iq requires
all the sub-routes in r were really announced as route updates.
7The top-level property for the routing protocols is of the form:
RouteAuth “ aϕI
ϕI “ @u@r, honest puq ^ send pu, rq Ą F@prq
This formula requires a route announcement r from an honest node has to
satisfy certain properties (F@prq). We only care about routes sent out by honest
nodes since a malicious nodes can send out any message. We call ϕI an invariant
as it has to hold on all states of the trace. The invariant ϕI depends on the
concrete definitions of F@prq. The goal of our security analysis is to find properties
F@prq such that ϕI is an invariant for all execution traces of the protocol. For
properties that we cannot prove it holds on all execution traces, we would like
to generate attack scenarios automatically.
3 Security Analysis of Routing Protocols
In this section, we explain our reduction-based approach to verifying the route
authenticity properties of secure routing protocols. We summarize our reduction
steps in Figure 4. The section number of the explanations of the reduction step
appears on the right hand side of the rule. These reduction steps form a proof
tree proving that route authenticity property holds on all execution traces of a
protocol, if all the leaf conditions can be verified. This figure serves as a road
map for the rest of this section (Sections 3.1-3.6). In Section 3.7, we summarize
our approach, discuss how these conditions can be verified, and explain how
attack scenarios are generated.
3.1 Considering Only Well-formed Route Updates is Sufficient
First, we narrow down the traces to only consider those where attackers always
send and store route updates that pass the check fck prq. These traces have a
much simpler invariant to specify and prove. We write Rck rpA, G,P, S0qs to de-
note the largest subset ofRrpA, G,P, S0qs such that for any action sendApu, v, rq P
T , where T P Rck rpA, G,P, S0qs, it must be the case that fck prq.
The soundness of this reduction step is proven by refinement. We detail the
proofs in Appendix B.1. We first show that if T1 is an execution trace of the
protocol, then there is a corresponding execution trace T2 where the attackers
only send out well-formed route updates, and T1 and T2 agree on the actions and
states of the honest nodes (Lemma 11). We further show that the invariant that
we want to prove does not depend on the actions and the states of malicious
nodes (Lemma 12). Combining the above, we can show that if ϕI is an invariant
on all traces in Rck rpA, G,P, S0qs, then it is an invariant for all the traces in
RrpA, G,P, S0qs (Theorem 1).
Theorem 1 If @T1 P Rck rpA, G,P, S0qs,A, G, T1 ( aϕI then @T2 P RrpA, G,P, S0qs,
A, G, T2 ( aϕI
8C1 : Last link of the route generated by an honest node satisfies FRpr, nq
C2 : ϕSI holds initially
C5 : Local assumptions about sentR and sentToR are justified by the ϕSI
C6 : Updates generated by a malicious node given an update of length 2 satisfy F@prq
C7 : Local assumptions about linkPrev and linkNext are justified by the ϕSI
C1
C2 :
ϕSI holds
initially
C1
C4 :
routes generated by
an honest node
satisfy F@prq
§ 3.5 C5 C6 C7
C4 :
routes generated by
a malicious node
satisfy F@prq
§ 3.6
C4 : routes updates satisfy F@prq Split
C3 :
ϕSI holds across
transition
§ 3.4
Stronger invariants holds on all execution traces where
attackers only send out valid route updates
@T P Rck rpA, G,P, S0qs,A, G, T ( aϕSI
§ 3.3
Route authenticity holds on all execution traces where
attackers only send out valid route updates
@T P Rck rpA, G,P, S0qs,A, G, T ( aϕI
§ 3.2
Route authenticity holds on all execution traces
@T P RrpA, G,P, S0qs,A, G, T ( aϕI
§ 3.1
Fig. 4. Reduction Steps
3.2 Stronger Invariants
To prove the route authenticity properties RouteAuth, we need to establish a
stronger invariant ϕSI . Formula ϕ
S
I states that all the route updates stored in
the routing table of an honest node must satisfy required property F@prq, and
that any route update in the queue of an honest node must also satisfy F@prq if
it passes the validity check. Further, for malicious nodes, any route update that
a malicious node receives must satisfy F@prq as well.
ϕSI = @u,phonest puq Ąp@r, r P RtTbpuq Ą F@prqq ^ p@r, r P Qpuq ^ fapr, uq Ą F@prqqq
^ pmalicious puq Ą p@r, r P Upuq Ą F@prqq
Additionally, the protocol needs to satisfy the following condition, which
requires that the last link in the new route update satisfies the property FRpr, nq.
Condition 1 (Honest) If rnew “ fupdpr, u, vq, and |rnew| “ n
then A, G, T sendApu,v,rnewqÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÑ S1 ( FRprnew, nq
The new route update is constructed by calling fupdpr, u, vq function, which
extends an existing route in the routing table with one more link. From the
strong invariant ϕSI , we can infer that r satisfies the property F@. If the last link
in the new route update satisfies the property FRprnew, nq, where n is the length
of r, then the entire update rnew satisfies F@, formally:
9Lemma 2 If A, G, T ( ϕSI , A, G, T sendApu,v,rnewqÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÑ S1 ( FRprnew, nq where
rnew “ fupdpr, u, vq and |rnew| “ n, then A, G, T sendApu,v,rnewqÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÑ S1 ( F@prnewq
We can prove that the strong invariant ϕSI combined with Condition 1 imply
that ϕI is an invariant (Theorem 3) using Lemma 2.
Theorem 3 If A, G, T ( aϕSI and Condition 1 holds then A, G, T ( aϕI
3.3 Non-inductive Conditions
The proof of an invariant holds on any execution trace is often carried out by in-
duction over the trace. Applying ideas of rely-guarantee reasoning principles [14],
we can reduce the inductive proofs into non-inductive conditions. We write T piq
to denote a trace from state S0 to Si.
Condition 2 (init) A, G, S0 ( ϕSI
Condition 3 (inv) if A, G, T piq ( ϕSI and δpSi, αq “ Si`1, then A, G, T piq αÝÑ
Si`1 ( ϕSI ,
Theorem 4 Condition 2 and 3 imply @T P RrpA, G,P, S0qs, A, G, T ( aϕSI .
Proof (sketch): By induction over the trace. Condition 2 proves the base case.
For the inductive case, we apply the Induction Hypothesis and Condition 3. [\
Next, we further simplify Condition 3.
3.4 Checking New Route Updates is Sufficient
The predicates used in specifying properties of routes have the property that
if they are true on a trace, then they are true on any extension of the trace.
This allows us to check the invariant only on parts of the new state that differ
from the preceding state. Therefore, we can further reduce Condition 3 to the
following. For a state Si, we use i to index the data structures in that state.
Condition 4 (inv-new)
– @r P RtTbi`1puq s.t. r R RtTbipuq, A, G, T piq αÝÑ Si`1 ( F@prq.
– @r P Qi`1puq s.t. r R Qipuq, and fck prq “ true. A, G, T piq αÝÑ Si`1 ( F@prq
– @r P Ui`1puq s.t. r R Uipuq, A, G, T piq αÝÑ Si`1 ( F@prq
The following lemma states that a route-dependent formula remains true
when a trace is extended. It can be proved straightforwardly by induction on
the structure of the formula.
Lemma 5 If A, G, T piq ( FRpr, kq then A, G, T piq αÝÑ T 1 ( FRpr, kq
Using Lemma 5, we can prove the soundness of this reduction step.
Theorem 6 If A, G, T ( ϕSI and δpSi, αq “ Si`1, and Condition 4 holds then
A, G, T piq αÝÑ Si`1 ( ϕSI ,
10
Proof (sketch): We need to show that for every route update r in Qi`1, RtTbi`1
and Ui`1, A, G, T piq αÝÑ Si`1 ( F@prq. Since we know that ϕSI holds at state
Si, by Lemma 5, we know that for any r that is in both state Si and Si`1, it is
the case that A, G, T piq αÝÑ Si`1 ( F@prq. For route updates that are not in Si,
Condition 4 ensures that A, G, T piq αÝÑ Si`1 ( F@prq as well. [\
Given the transition system defined in § 2, we further simplify Condition 4
based on whether the transition is made by an honest or a malicious node.
3.5 Condition on Honest Nodes
Condition 4 can be reduced to Condition 1 when an honest node takes a step.
Theorem 7 If Condition 1 holds, and ϕSI holds on the current state (Si), then
Condition 4 holds
Proof (sketch): First, an honest node only updates its routing table with a
route update, which is directly taken from the queue and passes the validity
check faprq. Since we already assume ϕSI holds at the current state, we can infer
that the new route update in the routing table indeed satisfies F@. Therefore,
the first bullet of condition 4 is trivially satisfied.
Second, all the new route updates in state Si`1 are generated by an honest
node. By Lemma 2, we know that F@prq is true for each of these updates. [\
3.6 Malicious Node Maintains the Invariant
The last piece of our security analysis of the protocols is to prove that any route
announcement r generated by the malicious node satisfies the property F@prq.
We face two challenges: (1) how can we identify all possible route announcements
that an attacker can come up with; and (2) given a route announcement r, how
can we effectively check that F@prq holds.
Semantics for F@prq based on local states. To decide the validity of pred-
icates sentR and sentToR , we need the entire execution trace. However, this
would require us to consider all possible traces, which is hard for automated
analysis. We can leverage properties stated in the invariant ϕSI , and reduce de-
ciding the validity of these predicates to only relying on an attacker’s current
state. The fact that ϕSI is assumed to hold in the current state reduces the space
of the traces that we need to consider. When specified properly ϕSI , allows us to
only consider the current state.
We first define semantics for route-dependent formulas based on an attacker’s
state. We write A, G,Mpuq ( FRpr, iq to mean that a route-dependent formula is
true given the set of malicious nodes, topology, and the state of a malicious node
u. The interesting cases are the rules for the predicate sentR and sentToR . We
explain the rule for sentR , and sentToR is similar, and can be found in Figure 8
in Appendix B.2. Predicate sentR pr, iq is true if there is a route announcement r1
in U , and the common prefix between r and r1 includes the prefix of r of length
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i. For example, assume that the route announcement pru1, u2s, d, urecv, Σq is in
U , then sentR ppru1, u2, v1, ...s, d, vrecv, Σ1q, 2q is true.
A, G, pu, I, Uq ( sentR ppp, urecv, d,Σq, iq
iff u is an honest node implies
there exists a r1 P pu, I, Uq, st.r1 “ pp1, u1recv, d,Σ1q
p and p1 has a subpath p2, and |p2| “ i
The local semantics are sound with regard to the trace semantics, if the
invariant ϕSI satisfies the following conditions: (Here $ is the logical entailment)
Condition 5 (Invariant)
– if sentR pr, iq is a subformula of FR, then FRpr, iq $ honest piq Ą sentR pr, iq
– if sentToR pr, iq is a subformula of FR, then FRpr, iq $ honest piq Ą sentToR pr, iq
Lemma 8 If A, G, T ( ϕSI , and Mpuq P Si, where Si is the last state on T ,
then Condition 5 and A, G,Mpuq ( FRpr, kq implies A, G, T ( FRpr, kq.
Proof (sketch): By induction on the structure of FRpr, iq. Most cases are straight-
forward. The interesting cases are predicate sentR and sentToR .
Since we assume that all the route announcements the attacker knows sat-
isfy @i.FRpr, iq, and from the above condition, we know that each honest node
appearing in the route announcement has sent out the announcement for that
subpath. Therefore, sentR is true on the trace as well. [\
Attackers have limited capabilities. An attacker can only generate a valid
route update either by constructing it without using any known route announce-
ment, or by using a prefix of the list of signatures in an existing route announce-
ment and adding more signatures signed using the secret keys that it knows.
The proofs can be found in Appendix B.2.
Lemma 9 Let Mpuq “ tu, I, Uu and Eσ P I, if @r P U , fck prq “ true, then
@r0 P KpMpuqq such that fck pr0q,
1. either r0 P Kptu, I,Huq
2. or Dr1 P U , and Dr2 such that r2 “ pp, ur, d,Σq, r1 “ pp@rv1 ¨ ¨ ¨ vjs, ¨ ¨ ¨ q
r0 “ pp@ru1 ¨ ¨ ¨uks, ¨ ¨ ¨ q, where skpuiq P I (i P r1, ks)
Reduction to finite scenarios We are able to reduce Condition 4 to a few
scenarios where the attacker exactly knows one route update of length 2. Intu-
itively, Lemma 9 shows that there are only limited operations that an adversary
can perform to generate new route updates. If we supply the adversary with a
route update of length 2, then the attacker would be able to perform all of the
possible operations.
Similar to the condition for the honest nodes, Condition 6 only requires
that each node in the section of the new route that differs from the existing
route to satisfy FRpr, jq. There is a different condition for each of the protocols:
Condition 6.(I) for Protocol 1 and Condition 6.(II) for Protocol 2. These two
conditions only differ in the route updates format, and the topologies to consider.
Condition 6 (New-Malicious)
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u2#u1# m1# u3#(2)#
(3)# u2#u1# m1# u3#
u2#u1# m1# u3#(1)#
u2#u1# m1# m2# u3#(1)#
u2#u1# m1# m2# u3#(2)#
Fig. 5. Possible Topologies
u2#u1# m1# u3#(2)#
(3)# u2#u1# m1# u3#
u2#u1# m1# u3#(1)#
u2#u1# m1# m2# u3#(1)#
u2#u1# m1# m2# u3#(2)#
Fig. 6. Possible Topologies
(I) Let r0 “ pru1, u2s,m1, d,Σq,
Σ “ rsignpskpu1q, pd, ru1sqq, signpskpu2q, pd, ru1, u2sqqs,
I “ tskpm1q, u1, u2, u3, pkpu1q, pkpu2q, pkpu3qu, Mpm1q “ pm1, I, tr0uq,
@G P G, @r P KpMpm1qq, if fck prq “ true then @j ě i G, tpru1, u2s,m1, d,Σqu (
FRpr, jq, where i is the length of the largest common prefix between r0 and
r, and G is defined in Figure 5.
(II) Let r0 “ pru1, u2s,m1, d,Σq,
Σ “ rsignpskpu1q, pd, ru1, u2sqq, signpskpu2q, pd, ru1, u2,m1sqqs,
I “ tskpm1q, skpm2q, u1, u2, u3, pkpu1q, pkpu2q, pkpu3qu, Mpm1q “ pm1, I, tr0uq,
@G P G, @r P KpMpm1qq, if fck prq “ true then @j ě i G, tpru1, u2s,m1, d,Σqu (
FRpr, jq, where i is the length of the largest common prefix between r0 and
r, and G is defined in Figure 6.
We need to justify why it is correct to only consider a route ru1, u2s, where
u1 and u2 has a direct link between them. We again leverage the invariant ϕ
S
I ,
which is assumed to hold at the current state. The following condition requires
that the invariants for Protocol 1 include the property that for any honest node,
the link to the previous node always exists (I); and for Protocol 2, links to the
previous and next nodes always exist for an honest node (II).
Condition 7 (Local to Trace)
(I) FRpr, iq $ honest piq Ą linkPrev pr, i, dq
(II) FRpr, iq $ honest piq Ą plinkPrev pr, i, dq ^ linkNext pr, i, dqq
We can prove that we can reduce Condition 4 to checking Conditions 5 - 7,
assuming that ϕSI holds in the current state. We list the intermediary lemmas
in Appendix B.2, and present the final theorem below. The check function of
Protocol 1 (Protocol 2) is f1ck p) (f2ck p)) respectively.
Theorem 10
(I) Let T “ S0 αÝÑ ¨ ¨ ¨S, T 1 “ T sendApu,v,raqÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÑ S1, Mpuq “ pu, I, Uq P S,
and f1ck praq “ true, and @r P U , A, G, T ( F@prq then Conditions 5, 6.(I),
7.(I) imply A, G, T ( F@praq (Condition 4)
(II) Let T “ S0 αÝÑ ¨ ¨ ¨S, T 1 “ T sendApu,v,raqÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÑ S1, Mpuq “ pu, I, Uq P S,
and f2ck praq “ true, and @r P U , A, G, T ( F@prq then Conditions 5, 6.(II),
7.(II) imply A, G, T ( F@praq (Condition 4)
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Proof (sketch): There are three steps. First, if an attacker can come up with an
attack route that satisfies Di. FRpr, iq given a set of updates, then it can come
up with an attack route given just one of the route in the update U (Lemma 13).
Using Lemma 9, we know that the attacker cannot use parts from two different
route updates in one update.
Second, by definition, any attack trace must satisfy  FRpr, iq for some i. For
each attack trace, there is a boolean assignment for the predicates in  FRpr, iq,
that makes  FRpr, iq true. The scenarios that we check in Condition 6 will enu-
merate all possible boolean assignments (constrained by ϕSI ) to the base predi-
cates in FRpr, iq. For instance, for the assignment honest piq “ true, linkPrev piq “
true, and linkNext piq “ false, for Protocol 1, topology (2) in Figure 5, the route
update pru1, u2,m1s, d, u3, Σq will have the above boolean assignment for i “ 3.
Of course, we create a scenario where honest piq “ true, linkPrev piq “ false in
Condition 6. This is when Condition 7 comes in, and we use ϕSI to ensure that
such scenario need not be considered. Therefore, if Condition 6 holds, then there
is no attack trace on any topology (based on local semantics).
Third, using Lemma 8, we can conclude that all the traces generated by the
attacker satisfies F@prq given the trace semantics.
[\
3.7 Summary and Discussion
By applying several sound reduction steps, the proof of route authenticity is
reduced to checking the leaf conditions listed in Figure 4. Condition 1 is checked
by careful examination of definitions of the protocol. Condition 2 holds trivially
since all the routing tables and queues are empty in the initial states. Condition 5
and Condition 7 are checked by manual inspection of the strong invariant ϕSI .
We could use a theorem prover to discharge these two conditions if ϕSI were
more complicated. Condition 6 is the most complicated one to check, as we need
to enumerate several cases. We use an automatic tool Proverif to help generate
all possible route updates, and check whether they satisfy F@prq. We will briefly
discuss how Proverif is used and summarize our analysis results in Section 4.
Finally, we would like to discuss how to generate attack traces from failed
checks of Condition 6. Whenever Condition 6 is not true, it must be the case
that the attacker can come up with a valid route (fck prq “ true), but there is
an index i such that FRpr, iq is not true. However, this route itself may not be
an attack trace in the sense that an honest node may reject it. The reason is
that an honest node checks faprq, not just fck prq. Recall that for an honest node
v to accept faprq, it checks fck prq “ true, and that the sender of r is a direct
neighbor of v. For a route update r such that fck prq “ true, but fapr, vq “ false,
it must be the case that the link between the sender of r to v doesn’t exists. Let
r “ pp@rus, d, v,Σq, then the attacker can similarly send r to another colluding
attacker node u1, which has a link to an honest node v1. It is obvious that u1
can generate a route r1 “ pp@ru, u1s, d, v1, Σ@rsignppd, p@ru, u1sq, skpu1qqsq that
the honest node v1 will accept, but that route does not satisfy F@.
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FRpr, iq Protocol 1 (Fig 5) Protocol 2 (Fig 6)
Prop.(1) linkPrev pr, iq T(1);T(2): T(1);T(2):
pru1,m1s, u3, d,´q pru1, u2,m1,m2s, u3, d,´q
Prop.(2) linkNext pr, iq T(1);T(2): T(1):
pru1s,m1, d,´q pru1, u2,m1,m2s, u3, d,´q
T(2): T(2):
pru1, u2,m1s, u3, d,´q pru1, u2,m1s,m2, d,´q
Prop.(3) honest piq Ą
plinkPrev pr, iq ^ sentR pr, iqq valid valid
Prop.(4) honest piq Ą T(1);T(2);T(3):
plinkPrev pr, iq ^ linkNext pr, iq pru1s,m1, d,´q
^ sentToR pr, iqq valid
Table 1. Security Analysis of Protocol 1 and Protocol 2
4 Case Study
We discuss our analysis results of the two variants of S-BGP based on the tech-
niques introduced in Section 3. In particular, we check whether Condition 6
holds. Our analysis is facilitated by Proverif [6], an automated cryptographic pro-
tocol verifier. We discuss the implication of the verification results, and how at-
tack traces can be constructed based the results provided by Proverif. The source
code can be found at http://netdb.cis.upenn.edu/esorics12.tar.gz.
For the protocols, we encode the data structures in Figure 1 and we encode
the honest node as a process. For checking Condition 6, we decide to hard code
the capabilities of the attacker as a process, as opposed to use Proverif’s standard
attacker model. The reason is that the protocols that we analyze are recursive
in nature, and our attempts to directly use Proverif’s attacker model cause non-
termination. More concretely, we provide the attacker process with a well-formed
updates of length 2 as described in Condition 6, and query whether any route
update violating the property F@prq can be constructed by the adversary. Since
Condition 6 contains only finite number of possible routes that the adversary
can generate, the analysis terminates.
Table 1 summaries the results of the security analysis of the two protocols
presented in Section 2.1. Each row contains the results of verifying one specific
property (FRpr, iq) listed in the second column. Recall that the top-level formula
(Section 2.2) is of the form: ap@u@r, honest puq ^ send pu, rq Ą @i, FRprqq For
each protocol, we list the attack route update – the route update that does not
satisfy @i, FRprq– and the topology in which this route update is generated. For
ease of presentation, we omit the signature list part from the route update, which
can be straightforwardly deduced from other fields of the update. The topology
is indexed by the number as presented in Figure 5 and 6.
Prop (1): The first property specifies the authenticity of incoming links. Pro-
tocol 1 allows the attacker to peel off both the last node in the route and the
last signature in the signature list from an existing update, and attach itself to
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the end of the route (with its signature). Since an honest node only checks the
correspondence between nodes in the route and signature in the signature list,
it will not detect the modification to the update.
This strategy does not apply to Protocol 2, as the destination of route updates
is included in signatures. However, it is still feasible for two malicious nodes to
collude with each other to make up a non-existent link in the update. An honest
node can by no means detect such deception.
Prop (2): The second property specifies the authenticity of outgoing links. An
attacker can come up with attack routes for both protocols.
There are two different attack scenarios for Protocol 1. The one is similar to
the scenario in Prop (1), where the attacker reused a subset of the signatures in
an existing update. There is no link between u1 and m1. In the second attack
trace, there is no link between m1 and u3, however, this does not not directly
correspond to a successful attack. The honest node u3 will reject this route since
m1 is not its neighbor. Nonetheless, it does correspond to colluding attacks as
discussed in Section 3.7: when the attacker colludes with another malicious node
mnew, which does not have a direct link to m1, but is connected to u3, then
prd, u1, u2,m1,mnews, u3, d,Σq is an attack trace, and will be accepted by u3.
An analogous analysis applies in Protocol 2 as well.
Prop (3): In addition to the authenticity of the links included in a route update,
we can also specify the authenticity of route announcements. In routing protocol,
it is possible that even if there is a physical link in the network, the link may
not be included in a route announcement as it is not part of the best routing
path to the destination prefix.
Intuitively, this property holds because an honest node only accepts routes
from its direct neighbors and signs the route it sends out. By combining the
analysis results here and the proofs in earlier sections, we have obtained a proof
that all traces generated by the protocol satisfy this route authenticity property.
Prop (4): The final property captures the difference in terms of security guaran-
tees between Protocol 1 and Protocol 2. The attack route for Protocol 1 coincides
with the one for the property linkNext pr, iq: there is no link between u1 and m1,
and u1 did not send the route announcement to m1.
In comparison, this property holds for Protocol 2. An honest node only re-
ceives from its neighbors, and also only announces routes to its neighbors, and
this information is protected by the digital signatures. However, this property
does not prevent worm-hole attacks: two malicious nodes can collude to intro-
duce non-existent links to the route update. If we assume that there is only one
malicious node in the network, then Prop (4) implies that all links in a valid
route announcement exist in the topology. Protocol 1 provides weaker security
guarantees, and one attacker by itself can create one non-existent link.
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5 Related Work
Prior work on formal network verification (e.g. [4, 12, 10]) have focused primarily
on functional corrections of the protocols, but not the security properties. As
compared to prior work on analyzing cryptographic protocols [9, 18, 13, 17, 11,
5, 3], secure routing protocols have to deal with arbitrary network topologies
and that the security properties are recursive. Most model-checking techniques
ineffective in proving these recursive security properties on routing protocols.
Our proof techniques share some similarities with prior proof-based techniques
[18, 17] for analyzing of cryptographic protocols. Our novelty lies in the reduction
techniques and combining manual and automated proofs, in order to deal with
proving security properties for any arbitrary network topology.
Recent work on verifying the security properties of wireless routing proto-
cols for mobile networks [1, 2, 8] focus on similar route authenticity properties.
Identifying these attacks are reduced to constraint solving. It is further shown
that the security analysis of a specific route authenticity property solely based
on topology on these wireless routing protocols can be reduced to checking these
properties on several four-node topology [8].
There are several key differences between our paper and the above body of
work. First, wireless protocols are typical reactive in nature, where routes are
requested on demand by the sender in a highly mobile environment. A route is
valid in this case as long as an actual physical path exists between sender and
receiver. In the BGP setting, given that each AS advertises a path based on its
routing policies, our route authenticity property not only rely on the network
topology, but also but also whether a node has announced a route in the past.
Second, the technique presented in [8] would not directly work for us, since
the attack route we care about include those that exist in the topology, but
not announced because of routing policy. Even though our proof technique also
reduces the attack scenarios to a handful of scenarios, it differs greatly from their
approach. Our technique makes use of the properties of the signature list and
invariant properties that is assumed to hold in the current state, and therefore,
we are able to use non-recursive conditions to identify attacks (or prove security).
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a reduction-based techniques that enables the route
authenticity property of S-BGP to be automatically checked for any arbitrary
network topology. Our case study using Proverif demonstrates the utility of our
approach on two variants of S-BGP. Our work not only provide a formal account
for the path authenticity properties, but also a formal proof that these properties
hold on certain routing protocols. Beyond S-BGP, as our future work, we plan to
apply our framework for analyzing recent clean-slate designs of secure Internet
routing infrastructures (e.g. SCION [22] and ICING [16]).
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A Adversary model
t PMpuq
t P analyzepMpuqq
pp, urecv, d, Σq P analyzepMpuqq
p P analyzepMpuqq
pp, urecv, d, Σq P analyzepMpuqq
d P analyzepMpuqq
pp, urecv, d, Σq P analyzepMpuqq
Σ P analyzepMpuqq
Σ P analyzepMpuqq σ P Σ
σ P analyzepMpuqq
t P analyzepMpuqq
t P synpMpuqq
r P synpMpuqq u1 P synpMpuqq u2 P synpMpuqq
fupdpr, u1, u2q P synpMpuqq
d P synpMpuqq v P synpMpuqq
forigpd, u, vq P synpMpuqq
signpp, skpuqq P synpMpuqq
p P synpMpuqq
p P synpMpuqq urecv P synpMpuqq d P synpMpuqq Σ P synpMpuqq
pp, urecv, d, Σq P synpMpuqq
Σ P synpMpuqq σ P synpMpuqq
σ :: Σ P synpMpuqq
p P synpMpuqq u P synpMpuqq
p@rus P synpMpuqq
p P synpMpuqq skpvq P synpMpuqq
signpp, skpvqq P synpMpuqq
t P synpMpuqq
t P KpMpuqq
Fig. 7. Rules for Deriving Adversary Knowledge
B Additional Lemmas and Proofs for Section 3
B.1 Additional Definitions and Proofs for Section 3.1
We first define a projection pT that extracts parts of the trace in T that contains
only honest nodes’ actions and states.
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Definition 1 pT is a trace that only has honest nodes in the states, and the send
actions performed by the honest node. Furthermore, ill-formed route updates are
removed from the queues in honest nodes.
The following lemma states that if there is a trace where the attacker did
not send a route update that pass the check, then there is an equivalent trace
where the attacker always send out a route update that pass the check.
Lemma 11 For any trace T P RrpA, G,P, S0qs, there is a trace T 1 P Rck rpA, G,P, S0qs
such that pT “ xT 1.
Proof. We construct T 1 from T as follows. We examine the trace from the initial
state. If we encounter a malicious node u sending a route update that is not well-
formed, we extract all the valid signatures from it, and record on the side that
u knows these signatures. We then remove this send action from the trace, and
continue our examination.
When we encounter a malicious node v that sends a well-formed update,
if all the signatures are derivable by v, then we continue. Otherwise, we must
have removed a send action by some malicious node that contains the missing
signatures. In this case, we can reconstruct a trace where all the updates are
well-formed. Given the list of signatures σ1 ¨ ¨ ¨σn, we find the first signature
σi that is not known by v, and the malicious node u that has σi, and send
an update corresponds to signatures σ1 ¨ ¨ ¨σi´1 to u. Note that this signature
is well-formed. Now u can send an update with signatures σ1, ¨ ¨ ¨σi to v. We
continue this process until no signature is missing from v. When i “ 1, we do
not need the first step.
This process continues until we reach the end of the trace. The resulting trace
is the projection of the original trace, since we do not change what the honest
nodes do, except remove ill-formed updates from its state, which is taken care
of by the projection definition.
Next, we show that a trace T satisfies a formula if and only if the honest
parts of the trace satisfies the formula.
Lemma 12 A, G, T ( ϕ iff A, G, pT ( ϕ
Proof (sketch): By induction on the structure of ϕ. The interesting cases are the
cases for predicates. Predicate link pu, vq does not depend on the trace, so the
conclusion holds. For predicate sentR pr, iq, based on its semantics, it is always
true when the ith node is a malicious node, so it does not depend on the trace
either. When it is is an honest node, T and pT agree on actions and states for
honest nodes, so the conclusion holds as well. [\
B.2 Additional Definitions and Proofs for Section 3.6
Lemma 9 Let Mpuq “ tu, I, Uu and Eσ P I, if @r P U , fck prq “ true, then
@r0 P KpMpuqq such that fck pr0q,
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G, pu, I, Uq ( FRpr, iq
A, G, pu, I, Uq ( linkPrev pr, iq iff i “ 1 or pJi´ 1Kr, JiKrq P E
A, G, pu, I, Uq ( linkNext pr, iq iff pJiKr, Ji` 1Krq P E
A, G, pu, I, Uq ( sentR ppp, urecv, d, Σq, iq
iff u is an honest node implies
there exists a r1 P pu, I, Uq, st.r1 “ pp1, u1recv, d, Σ1q
p and p1 has a subpath p2, and |p2| “ i
A, G, pu, I, Uq ( sentToR ppp, urecv, d, Σq, iq
iff u is an honest node implies
there exists a r1 P U, st.r1 “ pp1, u1recv, d, Σ1q
either (1) p and p1 has a subpath p2, and |p2| “ i` 1
or (2) i “ |p| and pp@rurecvsq is a subpath of p1,
or (3) r1 “ r
Fig. 8. Local Semantics for Formulas
1. either r0 P Kptu, I,Huq
2. or Dr1 P U , and Dr2 such that r2 “ pp, ur, d,Σq, r1 “ pp@rv1 ¨ ¨ ¨ vjs, ¨ ¨ ¨ q
r0 “ pp@ru1 ¨ ¨ ¨uks, ¨ ¨ ¨ q, where skpuiq P I (i P r1, ks)
Proof (sketch): By induction on the length of r0. The interesting case is when
the last node v in r0 is an honest node. In this case, r0 contains a signature signed
by v. By induction over the rules describing an attacker’s ability, we know that
it must be the case that this signature belong to some route update that the
attack already knows. From there, and the fact that all the route updates in U
are valid, we can derive that r0 must be a prefix of an existing route update.
[\
Lemma 13 There exists a route update r P KpMpuqq such that fck prq “ true,
and A, G, pu, I, Uq ( FRpr, iq, iff there exists an update r1 P Upuq and
A, G, pu, I, tr1uq ( FRpr, iq.
Proof (sketch): Let r1 be the route update that has the one that has the largest
common path prefix as r.
The rest of the proof is done by induction on the structure of FRpr, iq. The
proofs for the cases where the base predicates that relate to links or whether
a node is honest are trivial, since they do not depend on the trace. For action
predicates, let us take the sentR predicate as an example. If sentR is true based
on the set U , then it must share a common prefix with one of the update in U .
Since r1 has the largest common prefix as r, the predicate must be true based
on r1 as well.
The other direction is trivial. [\
